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Abstract: We advocate a dynamic approach to monetary convergence to a 
common currency that is based on the analysis of financial system stability. 
Accordingly, we test empirically volatility dynamics of the ten-year sovereign 
bond yields of the 2004 EU accession countries in relation to the eurozone yields 
during the January 2, 2001- January 22, 2009 sample period.  Our results show a 
varied degree of bond yield co-movements, the most pronounced for the Czech 
Republic, Slovenia and Poland, and weaker for Hungary and Slovakia. However, 
since the EU accession, we find some divergence of relative bond yields. We 
argue that a ‘static’ specification of the Maastricht criterion for long-term bond 
yields is not fully conducive for advancing stability of financial systems in the 
euro-candidate countries.  
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The central argument of our study is that monetary convergence to a common 
currency should be assessed on the basis of dynamic criteria and measures, not on 
static, single-moment thresholds. A successful convergence ought to reflect stability 
of the converging country’s financial system, coupled with achieving minimum 
financial risks, as reflected by the lowest inflation-, interest rate-, and exchange rate-
risk premia over the corresponding variables in a common currency area. A similar 
dynamic treatment applies also to fiscal and real economy convergence, which we 
leave out of this study for separate analyses. 
We are led to believe that our approach is particularly applicable for the 2004 and 
2007 EU entrants that are expected to adopt the euro in the near future. Upon the 
examination for their eligibility to adopt the euro, they are expected to attain the 
Maastricht criteria of monetary and fiscal convergence. The official monetary 
convergence criteria are specified as static thresholds, not as dynamic processes
2
. A 
static specification of monetary convergence thresholds entails significant risks: a 
candidate country may just be lucky to attain static or specified at their level-terms 
criteria of convergence, for instance, by applying excessively tight monetary policy in 
the period preceding the eligibility examination, at the expense of significant welfare 
costs.  In a different vein, the candidate may miss the criteria in spite of pursuing a 
prudent mix of monetary and fiscal policies prior to examination, due to a temporary 
economic slowdown and deflation in the common currency area. We therefore argue 
that a successful convergence ought to be based on dynamic trends reflecting 
advances in the financial system stability and the low risk environment in the 
candidate countries.   
We attempt to examine whether a dynamic convergence of interest rate risk has in 
fact taken place in the euro-candidate countries.  We deal with interest rate, or more 
specifically, with ten-year government bond yield convergence, since the declining 
path of inflation differentials vis-à-vis the eurozone and exchange rates has been 
widely examined in the literature (Orlowski, 2003 and 2008a; Matoušek/Taci, 2003; 
                                                 
2
 The Maastricht benchmarks of monetary convergence include the inflation, the long-term interest 
rate, and the exchange rate criteria. Specifically, the candidate’s headline inflation cannot be higher 
than 1.5 percentage points above the average of the three lowest inflation member countries. The yield 
on the candidate’s long-term sovereign bond should not be higher than two percentage points above the 
average yield in the three lowest inflation member countries. The exchange rate should fluctuate within 
the ERM2 band for at least two consecutive years, without the domestic currency devaluation.   
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Kutan/Yigit, 2005; Kočenda, et.al, 2006; DeGrauwe/Schanbl 2005; Kočenda/Valachy, 
2006;  Poghosyan/Kočenda, 2007). Convergence of bond yields, which is in our 
opinion an important, direct reflection of gains in financial stability, has received an 
in-depth analytical treatment only recently (Holtemöller, 2005; Kim, et.al, 2006; 
Orlowski/Lommatzsch, 2005; Baltzer, et.al, 2008).  Such dynamic convergence 
reflected by diminishing risk premia on long-term sovereign bond yields is crucial for 
sustainable price stability and systemic soundness of the candidates financial systems.  
It also lowers probability of potentially destabilizing nominal shocks upon their actual 
adoption of the euro.  
For the purpose of examining the interest rate risk or volatility convergence of 
bond yields we employ the generalized autoregressive conditional volatility models, 
with the in-mean variance and generalized error distribution specification (GARCH-
M-GED). In hindsight, risk convergence is detected if the in-mean variance 
coefficient is negative, and when the sum of ARCH and GARCH terms is less than 
one.  Our model of bond yield convergence is tested empirically during the January 2, 
2001-January 22, 2009 sample period for the 2004 EU accession countries that have 
been pursuing relatively flexible monetary policies, i.e. Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia
3
.  We exclude currency board countries (i.e. the 
Baltic States) as their policy regime eliminates the exchange rate risk while distorting 
inflation and interest rate risks, particularly in the presence of Balassa-Samuelson 
effects (DeGrauwe and Schnabl, 2005). 
In section II of the paper we review the pertinent literature. We subsequently 
proceed to empirical investigation of interest rate risk. The time pattern and data 
characteristics of the ten-year sovereign bond yields of the euro-candidates are 
analyzed in Section III. Volatility dynamics of their bond yields relative to the 
average yield in the eurozone member countries are examined in Section IV. The 
concluding Section V summarizes our findings and offers policy suggestions. 
 
 
II. Interplay between convergence and stability in the literature  
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 We have chosen to exclude the 2007 EU entrants, i.e. Bulgaria and Romania, from our analysis due to 
insufficient data for examining the time pattern of their bond yields over a full business cycle period.. 
They have introduced secondary trading of 10Y government bonds only recently: Bulgaria in January 
2003 and Romania in April 2005.  In addition, Bulgaria has followed a currency board policy regime.  
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Although the history of politically-determined monetary convergence and fiscal 
criteria for EMU entry is rather brief, there is already an extensive literature on this 
subject. The available studies examine rationality and compliance with the 
convergence criteria stemming from appropriate policies of governments and central 
banks, particularly in light of the Stability and Growth Pact. One strand of the 
literature investigates the links between real and nominal convergence (see e.g., 
Halpern and Wyplosz, 2001; Brada et al., 2002; Mihaljek and Klau, 2004; Angeloni et 
al., 2005; De Grauwe and Schnabl 2005; Kočenda et al., 2006), with a specific 
consequences for real convergence when the Balassa-Samuelson effects are evident. 
We disregard possible nominal-real links and concentrate our investigation on 
nominal convergence only, as the main motivation and purpose of our study. In 
general terms, the literature offers two approaches to the fulfillment and sustainability 
of nominal convergence. 
One approach is based on investigation whether the monetary and fiscal 
Maastricht criteria show long-run properties in their convergence toward the ‘static’ 
Maastricht thresholds. The time series of the respective aggregates are tested for ß- 
and σ–convergence or for co-integration. Kočenda et al. (2006) augment the 
convergence estimations by examining stochastic convergence in the residual. They 
find significant inflation and interest rate convergence, but limited fiscal convergence, 
which indicates the lack of fiscal sustainability. Brada and Kutan (2001, 2002) and 
Brada et al. (2002) apply a rolling co-integration approach, and find evidence of 
convergence for some variables, including M2 and prices, but none for other key 
monetary policy variables. Figuet and Nenovsky (2006) in their examination of 
Bulgaria and Romania employ an error-correction model that untangles long-term co-
integration of nominal, real and financial variables from short-run deviations and 
interpret the short-term adjustment to the long-run dynamics as convergence. They 
find convergence for price levels, interest rates and their spreads between Bulgaria 
and the EU, but not for Romania. They explain this result with an important 
institutional difference between the two countries - Bulgaria’s monetary policy is 
bound by a currency board, while Romania follows a more flexible monetary policy. 
As mentioned above, the currency board normally distorts country-specific inflation 
and interest rate risks, which could unfold particularly fiercely after adoption of the 
euro.  This literature offers important insights into the ongoing process of fulfilling 
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the Maastricht criteria. However, we are concerned with several problems that might 
question the countries’ readiness to adopt the euro.  
First, the convergence approach is taken from and linked to growth theory. But 
the Maastricht monetary and fiscal criteria refer to policies, which are difficult to 
encapsulate in a common theoretical framework. We are inclined to ask whether and 
how politically induced regime shifts may affect convergence, interpreted as the 
fulfillment of the pre-determined thresholds. The case of Slovenia might be 
illustrative: the country fulfilled all convergence criteria ahead of the euro adoption in 
2007, but inflation rates diverged thereafter.  Kenen and Meade (2003) provide 
another example.  They discuss the narrowing of the exchange rate criterion for new 
EU members from a ± 15 % to a ±2.5 % bandwidth, and warn against higher financial 
crisis risk for the countries in case the revision would be applied to them.  
Second, our reservation against the transfer of real convergence approaches to 
monetary phenomena seems particularly important within the context of today's 
volatile nominal economy. The ongoing turmoil in global financial markets generates 
unbalanced contagion and spillover effects on different countries with diverse 
financial systems and macroeconomic fundamentals (Orlowski, 2008b). Central banks 
and governments around the globe have recently intervened on several occasions 
since mid-August 2007 to mitigate heightened liquidity pressures, in order to: (i) ease 
concerns about an emerging credit crunch, (ii) prevent bank failures, and (ii) cushion 
the adverse impact of the financial market turmoil on the real economy. It seems 
necessary to develop a theoretical and empirical framework for the evaluation of 
convergence in risks.  Such framework goes certainly beyond the evaluation of the 
actual achievement of the Maastricht convergence criteria.  
Third, there is yet another theoretical argument that encourages our departure 
from a static toward a dynamic risk approach.  The co-movement in time of economic 
aggregates of integrating countries or regions is driven by two completely different 
factors: the integration of commodity and input markets, and the similarity of 
structures and institutions.  For example, presumed convergence of long-term interest 
rates of two countries might be achieved through a combination of strong cross-border 
investments spurred by financial integration, with dissimilar structural and 
institutional characteristics of financial and budgetary sectors.  Alternatively, it could 
be achieved through low integration and highly similar structural and institutional 
characteristics. In the first case, the risks of financial instability after an exogenous 
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shock remain high despite the apparent convergence. The adjustment of structures and 
institutions towards a common pattern takes more time compared to the financial 
integration in the eurozone, if it happens at all.  Therefore, the probability of 
occurrence of a regional financial crisis is embedded in the asymmetric distribution of 
shocks among the converging countries. The unbalanced contagion effects in the new 
EU Member States (NMS) from the ongoing global financial crisis might serve as a 
good example for the conflict between the intensity of strong financial inflows and 
outflows and the prevalent differences in financial and fiscal institutions.
4
     
This third argument relates our research to the theory of optimum currency 
area. In an attempt to assess the EU in its properties of being an OCA, Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1993) offer a method for the separating shock transmissions from the 
long-run adjustment component in the time series of member countries. They test 
synchronization of business cycles by calculating bivariate correlation coefficients for 
de-trended time series of output. They find low synchronization among EU countries 
compared to the United States, prior to the euro introduction. Their study reveals 
prevalence of asymmetric shock transmissions and high risks of regional output crises 
after adopting the common currency. A recent strand of the literature tests the 
hypothesis of a possibly endogenous character of currency areas.  It follows a seminal 
study by Frankel and Rose (1998), who argue that similarity of structures and 
institutions is the product of a common currency and single monetary policy, and not 
necessarily it’s pre-requisite. The main arguments raised in this literature are based on 
estimation of correlation coefficients on: increasing trade intensities (Frankel and 
Rose, 1998), as well as specialization patterns and the degree of financial integration 
(Imbs, 2004; Schiavo, 2008). In general terms, the studies seem to find evidence for 
increasing business cycle synchronization, or real convergence, and declining risks of 
regional output crises in the eurozone.  
There are only a few studies that transfer the idea of taking shock responses as 
indicator for monetary risks and the stability of the Maastricht criteria. The studies we 
know, concentrate on the impact of fiscal institutions on interest rate spreads, which 
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 In particular, countries such as Hungary with a weak fiscal discipline and a vulnerable monetary 
system dominated by lending activities of international banks are likely to experience extreme 
difficulties to compensate for the detrimental effects of sudden capital withdrawals on the financial and 
real sectors.  
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serve as a proxy of financial risk disproportions across regions. For example, 
Hallerberg et al. (2004) and Hallerberg and Wolff (2006) analyze the impact of 
qualitatively different fiscal institutions on sovereign risk premia in EU countries, and 
find: (i) the impact of the quality of fiscal institutions on the spread, and (ii), the 
improving quality of fiscal institutions in the EU members during the course of their 
preparation for the euro adoption.  We follow another methodological approach that 
has been also applied by Poghosyan and Kočenda (2007) in their study on foreign 
exchange risks in NMS and by Orlowski (2008a) for interest rate and inflation 
differentials between NMS and eurozone. These studies employ a multivariate 
GARCH-M model, which regards the conditional covariance terms and excludes 
arbitrage possibilities.  Poghosyan and Kočenda (2007) find that monetary policy has 
an important effect on the behavior of exchange rates in NMS. Orlowski (2008a) 
shows that relative interest and inflation rates over the eurozone might provide a 
useful basis for advancement of inflation targeting policy regimes in the converging 
economies. These studies further detect important differences across the countries due 
to underlying systemic differences between them. The appealing idea behind their 
methodology is to investigate the in-mean GARCH variances. These variances might 
be unstable and even increasing, thus require particular attention. A basic assumption 
of convergence is a decreasing in-mean GARCH variance in the time series, i.e. a 
diminishing risk.  Hence, information about the stability and risks cannot be just 
linearly extrapolated from historical data. It is better captured by the dynamics of the 
in-mean variance in the conditional mean equation. A further appealing advantage is 
that one can use financial variables with long-term time series.  Moreover, one can 
probably circumvent the problem of finding and calculating institutional variables, 
often for few moments in time only. The GARCH estimator grasps the aggregate 
effects of all the institutional and structural asymmetries, regardless whether real or 
nominal convergence can be actually observed in the long-period time-series. The 
sign of the in-mean GARCH variance coefficient reflects increasing or decreasing risk 
for nominal convergence. Considering these advantages, we have chosen to apply this 
method to the interest-rate convergence criterion.  
 
III. Time Pattern of Bond Yields 
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Sovereign bond markets in Central and East European countries have undergone a 
notable progress at the advanced stage of economic transition and during active 
preparations for accession to the European Union.  Long-term bonds could not be 
introduced at the early stage of transition from central planning to a market economy 
as modern fiscal policies had to be developed and the inflation drivers (such as the 
Balassa-Samuelson effects) had to stabilize in order to make dynamic inflation 
forecasts more reliable.  With the improved predictability of inflation, the term 
structure of the government bond yields became more stable, so did the risk premia on 
long-term bonds. For these reasons, long-term government bond trading could be 
launched only at a more advanced stage of transition. In the examined 2004 EU 
accession countries, secondary market trading of ten-year bonds was initiated in the 
beginning of: January 1999 in Hungary, May 1999 in Poland, May 2000 in the Czech 
Republic, January 2001 in Slovakia, and March 2002 in Slovenia.    
 During the early period following their inception, long-term bond markets in 
these countries were not fundamentally stable.  As shown in Figures 1a and 1b, risk 
premia of 10Y bonds yields in the May 2004 EU accession countries over the average 
10Y bond yield of the fifteen members (EUR15) that comprised the eurozone at the 
end of 2008 were considerably elevated, ranging from 680 basis points (bps) in 
Poland, to just under 200 bps in the Czech Republic.  It is, therefore, not surprising 
that the sovereign bond yield compression of these countries to eurozone bond yields 
has not taken place at the early period, as proven by Holtemöller (2005), Kim, et.al 
(2006) and Baltzer, et.al (2008).  During the course of active preparations for their EU 
accession, disciplined fiscal and monetary policies along with the declining inflation 
have helped reduce these premia considerably. Since 2004, however, the risk premia 
in the examined countries have evolved in different directions.   Bond yields in the 
countries that moved decisively toward adopting the euro, i.e. in Slovenia and 
Slovakia, as well as in the Czech Republic have become recently fully aligned with 
the EUR15 yield (Figure 1a)
5
.  The risk premium in Poland has been markedly 
reduced to the recent level of around 150 bps, while the premium in Hungary has 
remained considerably elevated at around 400 bps (Figure 1b). 
 
….. insert Figures 1a and 1b around here ….. 
 
 The detected dispersion in risk premia of 10Y sovereign bond yields in NMS 
is seemingly attributable to the prevalent differences in their fiscal discipline, 
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 Slovenia has adopted the euro since January 2007 and Slovakia since January 2009. 
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macroeconomic fundamentals and the risk structure of capital inflows.  As shown in 
Table 1, the government budget deficit is the largest in Hungary, which underpins the 
excessive, staggering interest rate risk premium over the average eurozone bond yield.  
In line with the top-heavy budget deficit, Hungary’s public debt and inflation remain 
to be the highest among the examined NMS.  Moreover, the lack of fiscal discipline is 
taking a toll on Hungary’s real economy growth – its real GDP growth rate has 
become the weakest within the analyzed group of countries. The analysis in Table 1 
that is based on 2007 data excludes Slovenia, which already was a member of EUR15 
at that time. It includes Slovakia, which met all the Maastricht convergence criteria by 
a safe margin two years prior to its euro adoption in 2009.  Poland and the Czech 
Republic also met the convergence criteria in 2007, as verified in Table 1, but they 
may face difficulties maintaining them in the aftermath of the current global financial 
crisis and economic slowdown.  They apparently have missed a ‘bona fide’ chance to 
adopt the euro at the same time as Slovakia. Moreover, some of the NMS that are still 
experiencing positive real GDP growth in 2009 are likely to fail the Maastricht 
inflation criterion for the reasons independent of their own economic policies.  This 
temporary setback is caused by the economic recession and deflationary tendencies in 
the EU member countries that are most severely affected by the global economic 
crisis, which contribute to a drop in the Maastricht reference rate for inflation
6
.   
  
….. insert Table 1 around here ….. 
 
In hindsight, the euro-candidates with the exception of Hungary fulfilled 
Maastricht convergence criteria in 2007; however, their budget deficits and overall 
convergence may be jeopardized by the current economic and financial turmoil. In 
spite of the present difficulties, the NMS need to foster institutional depth and 
resilience of their financial markets – they clearly lag in this area behind the eurozone 
financial system as shown in Table 1. Deeper, more resilient financial markets are 
likely to cushion possible nominal shocks associated with the euro adoption in the 
foreseeable future. 
 
                                                 
6
 Specifically, the Maastricht inflation reference rate reached 1.8 percent in February 2009, based on 
the Eurostat data (i.e. the average rate for Ireland, Portugal and Spain plus 1.5 percent). At the same 
time, the annualized inflation based on the harmonized index of consumer prices reached 3.6 percent in 
Poland and 2.9 percent in Hungary. Even the two new eurozone members, i.e. Slovakia and Slovenia 
would have failed the inflation test with the annual rates of 2.4 and 2.1 percent respectively. Only the 
Czech Republic met the inflation criterion scoring 1.7 percent.  
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IV. Volatility Dynamics Analysis 
 
A deeper insight into dynamic changes and systemic foundations underpinning 
convergence of interest rate risk in the euro-candidate countries is provided by the 
time-varying analysis of volatility dynamics of 10Y bond yields.  As noted above, we 
conduct this analysis for the 2004 EU accession countries that follow relatively 
flexible monetary policies.   
 Prior to reporting the results of volatility dynamics tests, we wish to display 
selected descriptive statistics of 10Y Maastricht convergence bond yields of the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia at their levels for the daily 
series that begin on January 2, 2001 and end on January 22, 2009.  The bond yields of 
NMS are compared with the average yields on 10Y sovereign bonds of EUR15. 
 
….. insert Table 2 around here ….. 
 
 As shown in Table 2, the mean value of the Hungarian bond yield is the 
highest among the examined NMS, so is its risk premium over the EUR15 mean. The 
lowest risk premium over EUR15 based on the mean is detected for the Czech 
Republic.  The Czech Republic also reached the lowest bond yield as well as the 
spread over EUR15 bonds in December 2008. The yields in the two new eurozone 
members, Slovenia and Slovakia, were reasonably close to the EUR15 average. The 
yields on Polish and Hungarian bonds were respectively 163 bps and 424 bps above 
the EUR15 average.  The data distribution of 10Y bond yields is right-skewed 
(skewness0) for all countries in our sample indicating prevalence of positive over 
negative deviations from the mean.  It is also mainly leptokurtic (kurtosis>3) or ‘long-
tailed’, except for Slovakia and EUR15, which implies a wide dispersion of yields or 
elevated risk during turbulent times.  At the same time, it suggests that NMS financial 
markets tend to be highly unstable during the periods of elevated global market risk. 
Evidently, a sufficient institutional resilience of NMS financial systems against 
exogeneous shocks has not been fully developed. As it could be reasonably expected, 
nominal bond yields at their level terms follow a non-stationary trend in all examined 
countries, except Slovenia.  Hungarian bond yields display weak correlation with 
EUR15 yields due to their fragile macroeconomic fundamentals, while correlation of 
the remaining NMS with EUR15 bond yields is strong.  Moreover, the linear time 
trend of NMS bond yields is declining by more than the EUR15 average yield, 
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indicating their ongoing convergence or declining risk premia.  Hungary is again an 
exception; the linear trend path of its bond yield is rising.  
 For the purpose of our empirical testing, we develop the following model 
examining co-movement between domestic CtR  and common currency or eurozone  
E






t RR   10                                                                                                (1) 
 
Considering non-stationarity of the examined bond yields at their levels (shown in 
Table 2), we convert the model variables to their first-differenced terms denoted by 
tr . In addition, the baseline model is augmented with the binary variable tDEU  
assuming the value of 0 for the period preceeding the EU accession and 1 for the post-
accession daily series. In the estimated equation we also consider the interaction 
variable Ett rDEU *  in order to ascertain a change in the co-movement between the 
domestic and the eurozone bond yields since the EU accession. The augmented model 









t rDEUDEUrr   )*(3210                                  (2) 
 
Time-varying volatility dynamics of co-movements between the NMS and the 
eurozone bond yields is examined on the basis of the GARCH(p,q)-M two-equation 
system.  The conditional mean equation is derived from Eq.2 and is supplemented 
with the GARCH in-mean conditional variance M component 2 1t . The conditional 









t rDEUDEUrr                    (3) 
 
The inclusion of the GARCH variance in the mean equation allows for ascertaining 
the overall convergence (or divergence) of government bond yields; therefore for 
determining declining (or increasing) interest rate risk. Convergence of bond yields 
(decreasing interest rate risk) is detected when 04  , while divergence occurs when 
04  .  An estimated value of the 1  coefficient is expected to be close to or higher 
than one if a given change in the eurozone average bond yield drives significantly the 
euro-candidates’ yields in the same direction. A negative estimated value of 2  would 
imply a further interest rate decline during the post-EU accession period.  However, a 
negative value of 3  would suggest interest rate divergence since the EU accession. 
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Our data generating process assumptions include also the generalized error 
distribution (GED) parameterization to account for a possible leptokurtosis in the 
data, which is realistic for bond markets and has been also detected from the 
examination of the bond yields at their level-terms shown in the Table 2.   






2 ...... qtqtptptt gghhh                                    (4) 
 
The ARCH terms 2' ptph   represent the impact of ‘news’ or shocks to volatility from 
p-periods before, while the GARCH terms 2q t qg    reflect persistency in volatility 
carried from q-periods before.  In particular, we are focusing on the sum of ARCH 
and GARCH coefficients; if its value is less than unity it implies diminishing 
volatility (as a proxy of declining interest rate risk).  
 The selected, most robust results of the GARCH-M-GED tests based on 
Eqs.(3) and (4) for each NMS bond yield are shown in Table 3. The orders of p for 
ARCH and q for GARCH terms for each NMS bond yield series have been chosen on 
the basis of minimum Schwartz information criterion (SIC) and maximum log-
likelihood.   
 
..... insert Table 3 around here .....  
 
 
The estimated 1  coefficients (sensitivity of relative change in domestic to 
eurozone bond yields) in the conditional mean equation imply that the changes in the 
NMS bond yields respond to the concurrent changes in the eurozone average yields in 
the same direction.  The co-movement between the domestic and the eurozone bond 
yields (i.e. the estimated value of the EUR15 bond yield coefficient 1 ) is the 
strongest in the cases of the Czech Republic and Slovenia, followed by Poland. It is 
markedly weaker in the cases of Hungary and Slovakia. This interaction is statistically 
significant for all countries. The in-mean variance or log(GARCH) variable in the 
conditional mean equation is highly significant only in the case of Poland – the 
negative sign of the estimated 4  coefficient indicates diminishing volatility of bond 
yields (declining interest rate risk) over the entire sample period. There is no evidence 
of major changes to the examined interaction between the domestic and the eurozone 
bond yields during the post accession period, as implied by the insignificant estimated 
DEU coefficients  2 . However, the negative signs of the estimated coefficient 3  of 
the interaction variable Ett rDEU *  for all NMS with the exception of Slovakia 
indicate some divergence in the time pattern of the domestic and the eurozone bond 
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yields during the post-EU accession period
7
.  This diversion may stem from a 
weakening political will of the Polish and the Czech governments to join the euro, 
particularly during the first two years following the EU accession. More importantly, 
it stems also from exacerbated interest rate risk in these emerging European market 
economies related to pronounced contagion effects of the 2007-2009 global financial 
crisis (IMF 2009).  
The estimated results of the conditional variance equation indicate a non-
uniform, highly unstable impact of shocks or ‘news’ about volatility from the 
preceeding periods, demonstrated by the complex structure of ARCH p-orders. The 
impact of such shocks on volatility of bond yields is rather instantaneous in the cases 
of Hungary and Slovakia. In contrast, there is a considerably slower decay of new 
information about volatility from the previous periods in the cases of the Czech and 
the Polish bond yields, as implied by significant high-order ARCH terms.  
The conditional volatility series is highly persistent in all examined NMS, as 
implied by high first-order GARCH terms, except for Slovenia and Slovakia, where 
shocks or innovations to volatility play a much stronger role.  Nevertheless, the sum 
of ARCH and GARCH coefficients for all countries does not exceed unity, which 
means a declining path of volatility, thus evidence of diminishing interest rate risk. 
However, the volatility series for all five countries is clearly leptokurtic (all GED 
parameters are less than 2), which implies that volatility of NMS bonds tends to be 
exacerbated during turbulent market periods. This finding demonstrates that NMS 
bond markets remain to be excessively vulnerable at times of elevated market 
vicissitudes.  
The results of diagnostic indicators, i.e. the relatively high log likelihood and the 
low SIC estimates imply that the examined series are fairly robust and stable in each 
country’s bond yield series.  In sum, it can be concluded that the volatility of long-
term bond yields is gradually declining in the examined countries, which underpins 
the ongoing, albeit rather slow compression of interest rate spreads over EUR15.   
Further insights in terms of time-varying properties of the volatility dynamics of 
NMS bond yields can be detected from the graphical time-distribution of the GARCH 
conditional standard deviation (GARCH-CSD) series estimated from Eqs.(3) and (4).  
Figure 2a displays the GARCH-CSD distribution for the Czech Republic. Volatility of 
the Czech bond yields was visibly elevated during the first two years of the sample 
period, i.e. in 2001-2002 (observations 1-700).  During the period preceding the EU 
                                                 
7
 This finding is also confirmed by Baltzer, et al. (2008) who demonstrate that NMS government bond 
markets have been increasingly affected by adverse shocks in eurozone markets, particularly since the 
2004 EU accession. 
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accession, volatility of the Czech bond yields was considerably lower.  However, 
during the post-accession period that is denoted by the shaded area (observations 870-
2104) the analyzed volatility was initially subdued. But it has elevated considerably 
during the most recent two-year period; notably as a result of contagion effects from 
world financial markets. In contrast to the Czech case, the numerical values of 
GARCH-CSD for Hungary (Figure 2b) are much higher.  Moreover, there is no 
visible convergence of interest rates, and the volatility of the examined series during 
the 2007-2009 global financial crisis has been way too excessive. There is a 
significant decline in volatility of the Polish bond yields during the same sample 
period (Figure 2c), with a strong dampening effect since the EU accession. There is 
certainly a significant increase in volatility of the Polish bond market during the 
recent period of the global financial distress, however, to a lesser degree than in the 
case of Hungary. However, the levels of GARCH-CSD for the Polish bond yields 
have been recently somewhat higher than for the Czech yields, indicating that Poland 
may still have to expedite efforts toward achieving greater financial stability.  In spite 
of a smaller, less-capitalized bond market in Slovakia, its GARCH-CSD has been 
relatively stable over the entire sample period, yet again except during the most recent 
global financial market jitters (Figure 2d). The GARCH-CSD series of the Slovenian 
bond yields is a particularly interesting case. Volatility of the Slovenian yields (Figure 
2e) has been consistently very low since the quick expiration of the significant shock 
in December 2002. It jumped somewhat on the eve of the euro adoption in January 
2007, in response to qualms related to the unpredictable effects of that move. But in 
contrast to the other cases, the conditional volatility of Slovenian bonds has not 
increased during the current financial crisis, which proves that the euro adoption has 
provided Slovenian bond market with an effective cushion against of global market 
risk.  
 
….. insert Figures 3a-e around here ….. 
 
In hindsight, there is a progress in stability of bond markets and the evidence of 
declining risk premia in the countries that have recently joined the eurozone, i.e. 
Slovenia and Slovakia, as well as in Poland and Czech Republic.  Similar stability 
gains are not seen in Hungary, where decisive policy measures ought to be enacted in 
order to improve economic fundamentals and develop resilience of its sovereign bond 
markets against potential shocks. The recent global financial crisis poses a serious 
threat to stability of NMS markets. Our analysis implies that the Slovenian decision to 
adopt the euro prior to this crisis was a critical contributing factor to the fundamental 
stability of the country’s sovereign bond market.   
 15 
 
V. A synthesis 
 
Our study examines the ability of the euro-candidate countries to mitigate interest rate 
risk as reflected by decreasing volatility of the ten-year sovereign bond yields in 
relation to the corresponding yields in the eurozone.  We devise a model analyzing the 
co-movements between the domestic and the eurozone government bond yields, 
which   includes a post-EU accession binary variable and the interaction variable 
between the post-accession dummy and eurozone average bond yield as additional 
regressors.  We test the model for NMS that have joined the EU since 2004 and 
applied relatively flexible monetary policies, i.e. the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia.  We employ GARCH tests with the in-mean 
conditional variance and generalized error distribution parameterization (GARCH-M-
GED) to investigate the time-varying, dynamic changes in the volatility of the euro-
candidates bond yields.    
We find evidence of a pronounced co-movement between the NMS and the 
eurozone long-term bond yields.  The effect is the strongest in the countries with solid 
macroeconomic fundamentals and stable financial markets (the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia), while it is the weakest in the unstable environment of Hungary. The low 
risk premia for the countries that have recently adopted the euro, i.e. Slovenia and 
Slovakia, as well as for the Czech Republic and Poland indicate improvement in their 
financial stability and creditworthiness. The co-movement of long-term government 
bond yields is the weakest in the case of Hungary and shows some divergence during 
the post-EU accession period.  The Hungarian bond yields show increasing volatility 
and misalignment with the eurozone yields due to the country’s deteriorating 
fundamentals. Hungary almost attained the Maastricht-specified reference rate for 
long-term interest rates at the end of 2007, but our volatility analysis shows that the 
Hungarian and the eurozone bond yields are increasingly out of sync. Our assessment 
is confirmed by the recent derailment of the Hungarian risk premium and divergence 
of bond yields since 2007. The wider spread of the Hungarian over the eurozone bond 
yields has been apparently exacerbated by the combination of the deteriorating 
Hungarian economic fundamentals and the contagion from the global financial crisis. 
In hindsight, our study advocates a dynamic treatment of monetary 
convergence to a common currency.  We argue that a ‘static’, level-specification of 
convergence targets, such as the articulation of the Maastricht criteria, does not reflect 
adequately the dynamic processes that are indispensable for ensuring long-term 
stability of the financial system in the converging country. In general terms, such 
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processes include institutional advancement and capacity building of financial 
markets and intermediaries.  Therefore, we focus on dynamic, time-varying changes 
in interest rate risk premia proxied by convergence of government bond yields.    
Institutional strengthening of financial markets and intermediaries, coupled 
with disciplined fiscal policies and monetary regimes based on inflation targeting 
have contributed to the declining interest rate risk premia in the examined countries.  
However, following the 2004 EU accession and particularly in the most recent two-
year period, the sovereign bond yields display rising volatility, stemming mainly from 
the proliferation of the global financial risk.  Contagion effects of the global financial 
crisis affect the euro-candidates unevenly; being more pronounced in the countries 
with unstable fundamentals.  Under such circumstances, the Czech Republic and 
Poland are likely to find it increasingly difficult to maintain their successful path of 
interest rate convergence, which may inhibit their efforts to adopt the euro in the 
foreseeable future.   
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Czech R. 6.6 -1.6* 28.7* 3.0* 4.3* 19.5 35.9 
Hungary 1.3 -5.5 66.0 7.9 6.7 14.1 31.5 
Poland 6.5 -2.0* 45.2* 2.6* 5.5* 5.0 43.8 













* denotes fulfilment of Maastricht criteria   
Data Source: ECB Convergence Report – April 2008. 
Table 2: Ten-Year Maastricht Convergence Bond Yields – Selected Descriptive 
Statistics. 
  January 2, 2001 – January 22, 2009 daily average series. 
 


















7.03/3.18 10.78/5.35 12.30/4.41 8.29/3.09 9.62/3.55 5.38/3.07 
Dec 2008 
avg level 
4.30 8.31 5.70 4.72 4.56 4.07 
Standard 
Deviation 





+0.54 +1.55 +0.90 +1.52 +0.09 
Kurtosis 
 

















+0.84 +0.35 +0.76 +0.87 +0.69 1.00 
Linear time 
trend 
-0.0008 +0.0001 -0.0020 -0.0017 -0.0021 -0.0004 
 
Notes: * McKinnon critical values for ADF unit root test at 5% probability are -2.86 
in all cases; ** March 18, 2001 – January 22, 2009 series for Slovenia. 
Source: Own calculations based on Datastream and ECB data. 
  
Table 3: GARCH-M-GED estimation results for 2004 EU accession countries. 
Dependent variable: daily average changes in domestic 10Y Maastricht Convergence 
Government Bond Yields 
  
 Czech R. Hungary Poland Slovakia Slovenia 
Cond. mean equation: 
 
Constant term 





















































































































GED parameter 0.770*** 0.410*** 0.834*** 1.018*** 1.5 fixed 
Diagnostic statistics: 

















Notes: GED parameter is fixed for Slovenia at 1.5; DEU assumes the value of 1 for 
the post-EU accession period (since May 4, 2004); the daily series begin January 2, 
2001 (March 18, 2001 for Slovenia) and end on January 22, 2009 (2104 
observations). *** denotes statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Datastream data. 
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Figure 1: Spreads between the May 2004 EU Accession Countries’ and EUR15 Ten-
Year Bond Yields. 
Notes: January 2, 2001 – January 22, 2009 daily average data series (2104 
observations). The vertical axis numbers represent full percent or ’00 basis points 
(bps). The shaded area shows the post-EU accession (May 2004) period.  
Data source: Datastream 
 
Figure 1a: Spreads between sovereign and EUR15 average bond yields for the Czech 










































Figure 2: GARCH conditional standard deviation residuals generated from 
estimations in Table 3.  
The shaded areas show the post-EU accession (May 1, 2004) period. Daily series 
January 2, 2001 – January 22, 2009 (2104 observations) 
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Source: Authors’ estimations based on Datastream data. 
 
